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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this paper is to study financial analysts working in the US and the Eurozone markets. I will 
study forecasting biases between sales and earnings. I will study whether forecasting biases are intentional 
and to what degree regulation policies can affect those forecasting biases.  
DATA 
I have obtained the data from I/B/E/S analyst database. I have included all stocks from New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq to my sample from the US markets. I have included all stocks from Frankfurt and 
Paris stock exchanges to my sample from the Eurozone. Time period goes from final quarter of 1994 to first 
quarter of 2010. This research period is split to two in order to study the effect of the regulation changes in 
the US markets. The study uses quarterly and annual financial reports and forecasts data.  
RESULTS 
I find out that Regulation Federal Disclosure and Global Settlement have altered markets in the US. 
Forecasting errors are distributed to larger area but on average forecasting biases have become smaller. In 
the Eurozone markets there has not been any significant development or improvements during research 
period. Analysts are affected by their prior forecasting errors and they react differently to positive and 
negative news. There are also some hints that even though average forecasting biases have declined, some 
of the analysts buy additional information from the management with favorable forecasts.  
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ANALYYTIKKOJEN ENNUSTEVIRHEET: VERTAILU YHDYSVALTOJEN JA EUROALUEEN MARKKINOISTA 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, miten analyytikkojen ennusteiden systemaattiset virheet ovat 
kehittyneet erilaisissa sääntely-ympäristöissä. Tavoitteena on valottaa, onko analyytikkojen tulos ja 
liikevaihto ennusteissa systemaattista virhettä sekä sen tahallisuutta. Lisäksi tutkin voidaanko 
lainsäädännöllä vaikuttaa analyytikkojen ennusteiden tarkkuuteen.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Lähdeaineistona käytän analyytikkotietokanta I/B/E/S:ia. Euroalueelta olen valinnut kaikki yritykset 
Frankfurtin ja Pariisin pörsseistä otokseeni. Yhdysvalloista olen valinnut kaikki yritykset Nyse:stä ja 
Nasdaq:ista otokseeni. Tutkimusperiodi ulottuu vuoden 1994 viimeiseltä neljännekseltä vuoden 2010 
ensimmäisen neljänneksen loppuun. Käytän tutkimuksessani vuosineljännes ennusteita sekä ennusteita 
koko vuodelle.  
TULOKSET 
Havaitsen, että Yhdysvalloissa rahoitusmarkkinat ovat muuttuneet sääntelyn tuloksena (Regulation Federal 
Disclosure ja Global Settlement). Ennustevirheiden jakauma on levinnyt, mutta keskimäärin ennustevirheet 
ovat pienentyneet. Euroalueen markkinoilla ei ole ollut minkäänsuuntaista merkittävää kehitystä 
tutkimusperiodin aikana. Aikaisemmat ennustevirheet vaikuttavat analyytikkojen ennusteiden tarkkuuteen 
kuten myös hyvät ja huonot uutiset. Löydän myös viitteitä siitä, että vaikka keskimääräiset ennustevirheet 
ovat pienentyneet, jotkin analyytikot ”ostavat” lisätietoja liikkeenjohdolta liian positiivisilla ennusteilla.  
AVAINSANAT 
ennustaminen, rahoitusmarkkinat, tulosennusteet, analyytikot, ennustevirhe, tahallisesti lisätty virhe 
1 
 
Table of Contents 
Summary .................................................................................................................................... 4 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.1 Academic motivation ................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Contribution to the literature ............................................................................................ 6 
1.3 Research problem ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.4 Scope and limitations of the study ................................................................................... 8 
1.5 Structure of the study ....................................................................................................... 9 
2. Literature review .................................................................................................................. 10 
2.1 About forecasting ........................................................................................................... 10 
2.2 Analyst forecast bias ...................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Regulation and political changes .................................................................................... 14 
2.4 Added value of analyst forecasts .................................................................................... 16 
2.5 Do forecasts really matter? ............................................................................................. 17 
2.6 Literature summarized .................................................................................................... 18 
3. Research question and hypotheses ....................................................................................... 19 
4. Data and methodology ......................................................................................................... 21 
4.1 Data ................................................................................................................................ 21 
4.2 Regression model and variables ..................................................................................... 27 
4.3 Model ............................................................................................................................. 30 
5. Analysis and results .............................................................................................................. 33 
5.1 Descriptive results .......................................................................................................... 33 
5.2 Evolution of the forecasting bias .................................................................................... 43 
5.3 Regression analysis ........................................................................................................ 54 
6. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 62 
7. References ............................................................................................................................ 63 
 
2 
 
Table of Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Research period sample .............................................................................................. 23 
Table 2. Summary of the different datasets .............................................................................. 24 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, quarterly dataset ...................................................................... 42 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, annual dataset .......................................................................... 42 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 1995-2000, annual  dataset ................................ 50 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 2003-2009, annual dataset ................................. 50 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 1994-2000, quarterly dataset ............................. 51 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 2003-2009, quarterly data .................................. 51 
Table 9. Forecasting accuracy percentage change from 1995-2000 to 2003-2009 .................. 52 
Table 10. Regression of analysts’ forecast errors on prior period forecast errors and 
informational uncertainty variables .......................................................................................... 58 
Table 11. Regression of analysts’ forecast errors for sales on prior period forecast errors and 
informational uncertainty variables, annual and quarterly datasets ......................................... 59 
Table 12. Regression of analysts’ forecast errors for earnings on prior period forecast errors 
and informational uncertainty variables for subperiods 1994-2000 and 2003-2009 ............... 60 
Table 13. Regression of analysts’ forecast errors for sales on prior period forecast errors and 
informational uncertainty variables for subperiods 1994-2000 and 2003-2009 ...................... 61 
Table 14. Chow-test for analysts’ forecasting bias for earnings on subperiods 1994-2000 and 
2003-2009 ................................................................................................................................. 62 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the sample, earnings ............................................................................. 26 
Figure 2. Evolution of the sample, sales .................................................................................. 27 
Figure 3. Contraction of the sample based on nature of the observed news impact ................ 29 
Figure 4. Graph of how data is gathered from different periods .............................................. 31 
Figure 5. Analysts’ forecasting bias in Europe compared to performance of the market index
 .................................................................................................................................................. 35 
Figure 6. Forecasting bias in the U.S. compared to market indices ......................................... 36 
Figure 7. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time, earnings, the U.S. ......................... 37 
Figure 8. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time without outliers, earnings, the U.S.
 .................................................................................................................................................. 38 
Figure 9. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time, earnings, the Eurozone ................ 39 
3 
 
Figure 10. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time without outliers, earnings, the 
Eurozone ................................................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 11. Development of the forecasting bias when release date gets closer, annual dataset
 .................................................................................................................................................. 45 
Figure 12. Forecasting bias evolution for earnings forecasts from 9 months to 1 month prior 
release date of the financial measure. ....................................................................................... 45 
Figure 13. Evolution of the standard deviation of the forecasting errors in the U.S. ............... 47 
Figure 14. Evolution of the standard deviation of the forecasting errors in the Eurozone ...... 47 
Figure 15. Quarterly forecasting bias of earnings for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms .......... 53 
Figure 16. Quarterly forecasting bias of Sales for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms ............... 53 
 
  
4 
 
Summary 
Analysts’ forecasts and errors of those forecasts are widely studied topics in finance. There 
are several anomalies in forecasting errors for which analysts’ forecasts are said to be biased. 
These biases can be related to behavioral mistakes the analysts make; or business relationship 
between the firm and the bank making forecasts; or analyst’ career concerns or the biases 
might be intentionally added as a way of getting better quality information from the 
management. In the U.S. there have been several regulatory changes between 2000 and 2003 
which were targeted to reduce incentive to intentionally add bias on forecasts and reveal 
hidden conflicts of interests. During same time there have not been anything similar 
happening in the Eurozone markets which could affect competitiveness of the Eurozone 
markets.  
In this study I will study forecasting errors before and after the regulatory changes in the U.S. 
and in the Eurozone. My study reveals that forecasts in the U.S. markets have become 
increasingly accurate after regulatory changes. In earlier literature there have been studies 
about an effectiveness of the regulation changes and those new regulations have been found to 
improve information content of the markets. I will compare this improvement to the reality in 
the market without regulatory changes and study whether intentionally added biases have 
diminished.  
I find out that the forecasts are less accurate in the Eurozone than in the U.S. markets. In the 
U.S. markets forecasting errors gradually get smaller and smaller when one gets closer to the 
release date of the financials. This kind of development cannot be seen in the Eurozone 
markets. After regulation changes there is significant increase in earnings forecasting errors in 
the U.S. markets. Same time variability of the earnings forecasting bias has increased. This is 
conflicting with some of the existing research but there are also supporting studies available. 
More importantly the difference between sales and earnings forecasts has gotten smaller. This 
implies that there is less intentionally added bias in order to please the management as my 
research hypothesis states. Altogether, the results hint that some analysts might add 
intentionally higher bias to their estimates in order to attain better quality information. The 
base bias has decreased. However, increase in coefficient for analysts’ uncertainty shows that 
some analysts are still trading their unbiased forecasts for information. There are also some 
hints that even though average forecasting biases have declined, some of the analysts buy 
additional information from the management with favorable forecasts.   
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Academic motivation 
Financial markets and individuals working on them have been under scope of finance. Earlier 
markets were thought to be nearly perfect which led to efficient market hypothesis. It is taken 
granted that market value of the equity carries information about future prospects of the firm. 
In a short, market value of the firm can be divided in two parts: value of assets and potential 
future value. The value of assets can be easily found from the firm’s balance sheet. The 
potential future value can be calculated as a difference between market value and the asset 
value. On average this valuation should be unbiased. Same way analysts’ forecasts carry 
information. There will be uncertainty about this future value as long as we don’t have 
magical crystal ball to forecast the future. The firms with large growth opportunities are 
usually called “growth” firms against more stable so called “value” firms. There is an 
information asymmetry between investors and the management of the firm. Here analysts can 
work as information intermediates that reduce this asymmetry. However, it is widely studied 
fact that analysts’ forecasts are rarely unbiased. This paper will study analysts’ forecasting 
bias between two different regulation environments and with two different variables which 
have different degree of incentive to add positive bias.  
Earlier research has handled forecasting bias thoroughly and also opened our eyes for 
behavioral mistakes which might affect analysts’ forecasting accuracy. Financial markets are 
now larger and there are more people following them than ever before. It would be easy to 
think that valuations would become more and more accurate with more people analyzing the 
markets. It would be interesting to know does this result a more efficient market. 
Unfortunately, as usually markets also give rise for different forms of conflicts of interest. 
Investors’ major concern is to try to understand future and probabilities it holds. In this 
research I will try to find out how accurate analysts’ future estimations are and have recent 
changes in the regulatory environment at the U.S. markets reduced conflicts of interest. I will 
concentrate to study information asymmetry between analysts and the firm management. 
Analysts’ ability to forecast accurately has been debated topic in academic literature. There 
are several studies find that analysts’ forecasts are biased in the way that can be interpret from 
publicly available data. Explanations for this bias have been numerous. In this paper I’m 
planning to test forecasting bias evolution between the Eurozone and the U.S. markets and the 
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effectiveness of the regulatory changes. I will limit my study to sales and earnings forecasts 
on publicly traded companies in the markets in question.  
 
1.2 Contribution to the literature 
This paper will study analysts’ forecasting biases on earnings and sales in two highly 
developed financial markets with different regulation environment (i.e. the U.S. markets and 
the Eurozone). I will study whether there are differences how forecasting biases have 
developed over time in these markets. In the U.S. markets there have been several regulation 
changes which have been targeted to even the playing ground and one of the scopes was to 
affect analysts’ ability to get exclusive information. I will study forecasting biases for sales 
and earnings forecasts separately because it is possible that analysts’ intentionally add bias to 
earnings forecasts more than sales forecasts. Therefore, sales and earnings forecasting biases 
might react differently to changes in regulation environment.  
Earlier studies have found out that analysts’ earnings forecasts are mostly upward biased. 
However, studies are controversial regarding how intentional this earnings forecasting bias is. 
Probably the truth is both. Partly the bias is intentional and partly unintentional (e.g. cognitive 
bias). I will follow the intentionally added bias strain of research presented by Lim (2001) and 
Mest and Plummer (2003) who suggests that analysts’ positive bias is rational and 
intentionally added to forecasts in order to get better quality information from management. 
The idea is that analysts try to please the management to build their relation and gain access 
for better quality information. Therefore, analysts add positive bias on financial estimates 
which matter the most for the management. This would translate to larger bias on financial 
measure such as earnings compared to sales forecasts.  
After implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure at the U.S. there have been 
controversial studies about its effectiveness. Some studies show that earnings forecasting 
biases have been reduced (e.g. de Jong and Apilado (2009)) and same time other studies argue 
that the biases have not changed at all. I will take account these regulation changes in my 
research and compare the U.S. markets before and after implementation of the regulations to 
the Eurozone markets. This way it will be possible to distinguish the true effect of regulation 
changes when development of the Eurozone markets is used as a reference point.  
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Earlier studies have examined analysts’ forecasting bias thoroughly and yielded valuable 
information which has helped to reduce conflicts of the interest on financial markets. In the 
United States major regulation changes happened at the beginning of 21th century. Those 
changes aimed to reduce unequal treatment of investors and restrict major financial firms’ 
ability to benefit from their information advantage. Those changes have been studied to some 
degree. My research will continue this strain from the literature and expand it by studying 
differences between two different regulation environments (i.e. the U.S. and the Eurozone) 
and by studying how forecasting biases evolve over time. I will study how regulation changes 
have affected the information asymmetry and the conflicts of interest. My study also contains 
much larger dataset than any of the earlier studies. I will also contribute to the literature by 
studying different levels of forecasting bias between the U.S. and the Eurozone markets. 
There have been arguments that compared to the U.S. the Eurozone markets are less efficient. 
This will in turn affect competitiveness of European financial markets and in the end, cost of 
the capital in the Eurozone equity markets.  
 
1.3 Research problem 
This study will try to answer several questions considering forecasting bias. I approach the 
problem from intentionally added bias viewpoint [i.e. Lim (2001), Mest and Plummer (2003), 
de Jong and Apilado (2009)]. I will start by researching whether analysts truly make bias on 
average. Many researchers have already found out that analysts do make on average over-
optimistic forecasts. After judging the situation with biasness of the forecasts, I will continue 
to reveal more information of the phenomenon and study it in different markets and time 
periods.  
I will try also find out have analysts intentionally added biases in their forecasts to please firm 
managers. There are two methods from literature which try to capture analysts’ intentional 
biases. First, Mest and Plummer (2003) argued that analysts add larger bias for financial 
measures which are more important for management (e.g. earnings versus sales). Second, de 
Jong and Apilado (2009) argue that Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) has diminished 
analysts’ need to please managers. They study biases before and after Reg FD. I will study 
those intentionally added biases with both frameworks and compare them. Because I don’t 
believe that forecasting biases disappear in one night I will also study how those biases evolve 
over time and with evidences obtained from the United States and the Eurozone.  
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The final research problem in my study is to compare different regulation environments, 
namely the U.S. and the Eurozone. It has been argued that the Eurozone is less competitive in 
financial markets and the less effective regulation could be one of the reasons. The less 
effective regulation makes it harder for analysts to produce accurate estimates without inside 
information from management. Therefore, they would have greater incentive to upward bias 
their estimates. This in turn increases cost of capital for European firms. My regression model 
takes account several well-known anomalies which could potentially cause forecasting bias 
(e.g. estimate revision based on prior error, news effect, information availability and firm 
specific difficulty of forecasting). This is done in order to prevent different magnitude of 
biases just because markets’ structure is different.  
 
1.4 Scope and limitations of the study 
Availability of good quality data is major limitation of my study. To get up-to-date company 
information for research the events should be manually picked from some news service. It 
would too much work to pick up all preliminary earnings/sales figures. For this I do not have 
sufficient resources. Therefore, I cannot get data between financial reporting periods. From 
analyst databases such as I/B/E/S it is possible to get analysts’ estimates from different points 
of time but unfortunately firms own earnings guidance publications are not recorded in 
similar manner.  
I/B/E/S reports in its basic set only consensus estimates. It will not be possible to examine 
individual analysts’ forecasts. I/B/E/S is regarded as high quality source of earnings forecast 
data. Unfortunately it still has some holes in its data. Firms from the United States have 
exhaustive data available whereas the Eurozone data contains only major firms and even for 
them time series are short. I/B/E/S database contains wide coverage of earnings forecast data. 
It is major player in earnings forecasting industry and its data is considered to be high quality. 
For my research it provides sufficient number of observations from large sample of firms. 
However, I/B/E/S database has started to report sales forecasts much later and there are lots of 
companies with only earnings forecasts without sales estimates. This limits my sample of 
sales forecasts which might potentially reduce reliability and accuracy of the results of the 
study. This actually becomes problem only with the European companies. This is taken into 
the account when the results are discussed.  
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Most of the analysts revise their estimates towards end of the financial period. These revisions 
make forecasts more and more accurate. It could be possible that sufficiently close publication 
of the financial report analysts’ forecast get closer and closer of being unbiased. Usually firms 
publish their own estimates and preliminary figures which guide analysts in making their 
estimates and at natural way reduce forecasting errors. However, I am interested in how 
analysts behave based on their prior forecasting bias and therefore forecast errors are observed 
just after prior release of actual figures. This prior forecasting error affects current period’s 
forecasting accuracy. For quarterly and annual releases, I record my data with monthly 
intervals.  
Because regulation changes have affected firms working in the United States, I will naturally 
pick up all companies from NYSE and Nasdaq to my sample. Earlier studies have mainly 
used the U.S. data and therefore my study can be compared to their findings. However, I’m 
also including companies outside the U.S. in order to compare magnitude of forecasting bias 
between different regulation environments (i.e. the Eurozone). Unfortunately, the data outside 
the U.S. in I/B/E/S database is limited and contains mainly the largest global firms. Therefore, 
foreign dataset might have less observations and quality of the data might be questionable.  
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The Section 1 will serve as an introduction and motivation to my research. In the Section 2 I 
will shortly discuss previous literature available. Section 2 is divided to general discussion 
about forecasting on financial markets and to discussion about analysts’ forecasting bias. 
Section 2 will also make a glance on changes in regulation environment and its possible 
implications on analysts’ forecasts. After that I will gather evidences how analysts could 
deliver value to investors with their estimates and finally I will try to find evidences if 
analysts’ forecasts and their biases matter on financial markets. The Section 3 contains my 
research questions and hypothesis which are used as guideline in my study. The Section 4 will 
contain description of my research framework, employed data and methodology. The Section 
5 contains empirical results and analysis of the study. The final part, Section 6 concludes and 
summarizes my findings.  
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2. Literature review 
 
2.1 About forecasting 
Everybody tries to forecast future but not many of us do it for living. However, in financial 
markets there is a group of people who make their living by revealing shades of the future and 
that group is called equity analysts. As an example, with CAPM model it is possible to 
calculate expected rate of return for certain asset. CAPM model has been derived to 
Fama&French multifactor model [French (2003)] to better explain actual realized returns. In 
addition to CAPM based expected return model there are numerous other models. Time series 
do this poorly, for example Brown and Rozeff (1978) show that analyst forecasts are superior 
to time series models. Next, I will try to study how analysts’ forecasts are born and what kind 
of errors they may contain.  
Before going any further I will define what is meant by forecasting error and bias. Many 
forecasts are shown to contain positive or negative bias. Usually error is defined as following 
𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝐹𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡 − 𝐴𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡       (1) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is forecast error for period t and firm i; 𝐹𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡  is forecast value for period t; and 
𝐴𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡  is actual value of the financial measure for the period t. There are almost always 
forecasting errors occurring in variety of degrees. The forecasting error’s distribution has non-
zero standard deviation. If forecasts are biased on average, this is called as forecasting bias. 
Individual analysts make forecasting errors. When this happens on collective level it is called 
a forecasting bias. Biases can be found from numerous fields of finance and quite often those 
biases are positive as for example Fleming (1998) shows in his research that implied volatility 
from index options is upward biased estimator for realized volatility. Still those biased 
estimators carry some information and make market more efficient. Thus analysts’ forecasts 
are known to be biased and I will next shortly summarize research done so far. Regardless of 
their biasedness analyst forecasts carry information and can beat time series methods. Almost 
30 years later Laws and Thompson (2004) offered evidence about predictive power of the 
financial futures. They found out that forecasts based on future prices are superior to random 
walk and stochastic models. However, the results are not consistent for all futures and 
durations. In most of the cases futures give superior forecast to stochastic models. Still in the 
end, they conclude that interest and exchange rate markets are approximately efficient and 
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forecasts cannot be used to gain abnormal returns. However, they didn’t study how forecasts 
based on futures perform against analyst forecasts. Later, I will return to this topic when I 
discuss whether analysts can deliver value for investors.  
 
2.2 Analyst forecast bias 
It is a widely accepted fact based on empirical research that analysts’ forecasts of earnings 
have on average positive bias [Abarbanell (1991) and Stickel (1990)]. There are numerous 
different explanations for forecasting bias: (i) internal pressure on analysts to increase firm 
brokerage commissions, investment banking business and proprietary trading profits 
[Kirgman et.al. (2002)]; (ii) analysts unintentional cognitive bias [Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Kahneman and Lovallo (1993)]; (iii) analysts’ career 
incentives and herding [Hong and Kubik (2003)]; (iv) inability to efficiently use information 
[Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Ali et.al. (1992) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999)]; (v) 
pressure from the management of the companies covered by analysts [Lim (2001) and Mest 
and Plummer (2003) among others]. Especially, Studies of Mest and Plummer (2003) and 
Lim (2001) are interesting concerning my study. They argue that positive bias on forecasts is 
rational and done with a purpose. Before going to different explanations of the positive bias 
let us think a moment in what kind of environment the analysts do their research and forecasts. 
Earlier I already showed how forecasting errors and biases differ from each other. Now I will 
introduce a measure for accuracy of the forecasts. Mean squared error is a widely used 
measure for the accuracy. The forecast error can be divided to squared bias and variance of 
forecasting errors  
𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟      (2) 
where MSE is mean squared error of the forecast; 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠2 is squared bias and the last term, 𝑉𝑎𝑟, 
is variance of the forecast error. Therefore it could be possible to reduce mean squared error 
of the forecast by doing trade-off between unbiased estimates for reduced variance [Lim 
(2001)]. A livelihood of an analyst is dependent on accuracy of his forecasts. A good analyst 
is expected to provide accurate estimates for firm’s earnings. However, accuracy and positive 
career development do not necessary go hand in hand as Hong and Kubik (2003) show. The 
optimal forecasts for career development are slightly overoptimistic.  
12 
 
Next, let us study other theories for overoptimistic forecasts. This forecasting bias appears 
irrational and it can be predicted from publicly available information [Lim (2001)]. For this 
reason, I will preview several explanations for this apparent positive bias. One possible 
explanation would be investment banking relationship with a firm and attempt to get more 
business to analyst’s own bank. Michaely and Womack (1999) studied this relationship 
between forecast firm and the bank employing the analyst which could be source of conflict 
of interest. Underwriting investment bank prefers more positive earnings forecasts because it 
makes book building process easier and reduces risk of being underwriter. However, this kind 
of relationship can be only measurable near initial public offerings (IPO), seasonal equity 
offerings (SEO) or such kind of events.  
Other explanation would be that young analysts whose career has just begun, will bias their 
estimates closer to consensus in order to prevent extreme mistakes which might result 
punishment. Laster, Bennet and Geoum (1996) and Scharfstein and Stein (1990) observed this 
kind of behavior that younger analysts may give forecast which are closer to consensus 
because of career concerns. For young analyst it may be risky to publish forecasts which are 
far from consensus and fail to capture reality. The idea is that small biases from consensus 
can be forgiven as well as a bit too optimistic forecasts. This would result forecasts to be too 
positive on average.  
One line of research tries to explain the bias in terms of analysts’ ability to process 
information. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) argue that analysts are likely to overreact to new 
information and create forecasts which are too extreme. This is especially true with positive 
information. With negative information relation is completely opposite. Negative information 
is not completely transferred to forecast and the forecast becomes too positive. Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) found the same kind of relation based on their research that analysts 
underreacted to negative information and overreact to positive information. After negative 
information analysts tend to revise their forecasts too little and with positive information 
forecasts are revised too much. This would explain momentum effect of analysts’ forecasts 
and positive bias on average. 
Kini et.al. (2009) show how analysts’ research portfolio could affect forecasting accuracy and 
bias. The research portfolios which consists country diversification have higher forecast 
accuracy. It seems that the relation between diversification style (country vs. sector) and 
forecast accuracy is context-specific. Internationally sector diversification increases accuracy 
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but inside U.S. it reduces accuracy. It could be that national markets (the U.S. markets) differ 
from international markets less than industries from each other. McNichols and O’Brien 
(1997) take a little different perspective to analysts' research portfolios and argue that positive 
bias may arise because analysts tend to choose companies for their portfolio based on their 
true opinion of those companies. Analysts tend to choose companies they like and have 
positive opinion. They also might censor their forecasts if their expectations are sufficiently 
low compared to their own earlier opinion. They will censor the lower tail of the distribution 
of forecasts. Also analysts are slow to change their forecasts when new adverse information 
comes up which creates upward bias. 
Based on above research, overoptimism or positive bias seems mostly irrational (expect 
career concerns hypothesis). However, Lim (2001) attacks against this belief and argues that 
optimal forecasts from perspective of the analyst are optimistically biased. This is explained 
by the fact that managers prefer favorable forecasts and they are also the main source of non-
public information for analysts. In order to reduce variability of forecasts and to attain 
information from managers, analysts should give forecasts that are positively biased. The 
analysts search acceptance of the management to be granted inside information which could 
potentially reduce their forecasting bias (see equation 2 for two sources of the forecasting 
error). In other words analysts seek to reduce their variance of estimation error and trade-off 
is intentionally added positive bias. This could increase their forecast accuracy if measured 
with mean squared error (MSE). Even after tightening of the regulation, managers are shown 
to favor analysts who give them favorable forecasts [Mayew (2008)].  
Mest and Plummer (2003) continue above research of Lim (2001) about rational bias and find 
that positive bias is smaller for financial measures which are less important for managers. 
They propose that analysts have smaller incentive to upward bias their estimates for sales than 
for earnings forecasts because management has more interest on earnings forecasts. The 
reasoning is that management’s compensation is more often linked to earnings based variables 
than sales based variables. Later on, de Jong and Apilado (2009) argue that greater reduction 
of earnings forecasting bias after implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
supports the theory of purposely added bias for enhanced information access.  
There has already been earlier evidence on information access effect which links fine with 
findings of Lim (2001) and Mest and Plummer (2003). Mikhail et.al. (1997) showed that 
experience and firm-specific knowledge improve accuracy of the forecasts. However, there is 
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also evidence from Chen and Jiang (2006) that analysts tend to over-weight their firm-specific 
information and unintentionally create biased estimates because information is not effectively 
utilized.  
 
2.3 Regulation and political changes 
Recently, there have been several significant changes in regulation environment in the U.S. 
which have not yet been widely studied [see SEC (2000) and SEC (2003a)]. I will next 
shortly summarize the most important legal and regulation changes which are likely to have 
impact on analysts’ production of forecasts. Earlier in the United States it has been possible 
for companies to grant conference calls for selected audience like analysts and institutional 
investors. This changed in October 2000 with Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) which 
effectively means that current investors and potential investors should be able to get 
information equally. Whenever any information is released from the firm it should available 
to everyone and not just selected analysts. This could potentially affect on the need for 
analysts to please management in order to get better quality information. However, Mayew 
(2008) shows that even after implementing Reg FD instead of granting information 
selectively to analysts the management favors analysts giving good forecasts, during 
conference calls by giving them more chances to ask questions.  
Moreover, in 2003 there were two important changes in regulation environment in the U.S., 
i.e. the Regulation Analyst Certification [see SEC (2003b)] and the Global Settlement [see 
SEC (2003a)]. The purpose of the Regulation Analyst Certification is meant to reveal hidden 
conflicts of interest. Analysts are required to report their potential conflicts of interest and 
related monetary compensations. I assume that this could potentially reduce intentionally 
added bias on analysts’ forecasts. The Global Settlement was an agreement between SEC, 
NYSE, Nasdaq and ten of the U.S. largest investment firms. The purpose was to reduce 
investment bankers’ pressure on analysts to provide favorable forecasts for the management 
and to sanction for past misbehavior.  
All those above regulation changes were implemented in order to reduce incentive to please 
management of the firms and to reveal hidden conflicts of interests. This should reduce 
positive bias of forecasts which is partly based on analysts’ attempt to search managements 
favor. This effectively means that forecast biases should be different for period before 2000 
from forecast biases after 2003. That is, there should be a difference in forecast errors if it is 
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assumed that firms have earlier used their information asymmetry for their own advantage 
and entered in malicious practices.  
There have been several studies which try to estimate Reg FD’s effect on financial markets 
[e.g. Gintschel and Markov (2004), Jackson and Madura (2007) and de Jong and Apilado 
(2009)]. Gintschel and Markov (2004) present early evidences that absolute price impact of 
analyst announcement is 28% lower than prior Reg FD. This price impact reduction has been 
even greater for growth firms which can be interpret as evidence that analysts have 
consciously added bias on their estimates. De Jong and Apilado (2009) show that earnings 
forecasts are still biased, but bias is less than before Reg FD. Their study difference between 
growth and value stocks and find out that reduction in bias is larger for growth stocks. They 
argue in lines of Lim (2001) that analysts have added bias in their estimates intentionally to 
build relationship with firm’s management. After Reg FD those incentives are cut off and the 
results suggest that analysts did not misinterpret news signals from firm but consciously 
maintained good relationship with growth firm managers. The analysts consciously try to 
offset negative earnings surprises mainly for growth stocks and therefore to generate forecasts 
which are overoptimistic on average.  
Barber et.al. (2001) show that analysts act as information intermediates between firm and 
markets. They process and deliver their insider information through earnings forecasts and 
buy/sell recommendations. Jackson and Madura (2007) argue that the amount of the insider 
information leaks has decreased significantly after implementation of Reg. FD. They argue 
that analyst announcements contain less information which is not already available in the 
market. This reduces price impact of the analyst announcements. Gintschel and Markov 
(2004) showed that Reg FD has reduced the difference (measured with price impact) between 
large brokerage houses and other brokerage houses and therefore leveled playing ground for 
new players. This can be interpreted so that investors believed that earlier different brokerage 
houses had different access to information about an analyzed firm.  
Bagella et.al. (2007) study differences of analyst forecasting errors between U.S. and 
European markets. They show that forecasting errors are consistently higher for the Eurozone. 
However, forecasting biases have been getting smaller and smaller at the 90s. In both markets 
biases tend to converge when approaching the release date. They argue that the quality of 
information is lower in the Eurozone and this justifies higher forecasting bias. This could 
potentially increase the possibility for insider trading and reduce access of small shareholders 
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to financial markets. This could be one reason for weak international competitiveness of the 
Eurozone financial markets in attracting foreign capital and reduced access to cheap external 
financial sources for listed companies.  
 
2.4 Added value of analyst forecasts 
Analysts’ forecasts can add value for investors. There are numerous cross-section studies in 
which analysts’ forecasts are used to explain stock returns and studies in which possibility to 
generate abnormal returns with analysts’ forecasts and recommendations is examined. Barber 
et.al. (2001) find out that acting based on stock recommendations can generate abnormal 
returns of four percent annually. However, in order to capture those profits daily portfolio 
rebalancing and quickly response to recommendation changes is required. With less frequent 
rebalancing abnormal returns diminish. It cannot be said that after transaction costs it would 
be possible to gain positive abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations. In this 
aspect semi-strong form of market efficiency holds. For least favorable recommendations 
market price adjustment takes more time which creates asymmetry on market price reaction 
between favorable and less favorable forecasts.  
Womack (1996) show in his research that a recommendation change causes initial stock price 
reaction. The reaction does not end there but there will also be momentum effect which 
differs for positive and negative recommendation changes. The momentum effect is longer 
(up to six months) and greater in order of magnitude for sell recommendations. Womack 
(1996) argues that scholars spend great time in analyzing analysts’ earnings forecast even 
thought producing earnings forecast is secondary job for analysts. The main priority is always 
making timely buy/sell recommendations which require stock picking and timing skills. 
Analysts issue “buy” recommendations seven times more than “sell” recommendations. This 
shows that there is a “cost” for issuing a “sell” recommendation which is larger than for “buy” 
recommendation. Womack (1996) also finds that this effect is much stronger for small 
companies. 
Porta (1996) shows that analysts’ earnings estimates are too extreme. When stocks are sorted 
by expected growth rate, portfolios with low expected growth rate overperform those with 
higher expected growth rate. The event study grants evidence that market was initially overly 
pessimistic about the earnings of low expected earnings portfolio and over-optimistic about 
the earnings of high expected earnings portfolio. Low expected growth stocks have lower 
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volatility and betas than ones with higher expected growth. Furthermore, they perform 
significantly better during bear market. However, the returns of betting against analyst are 
about same magnitude than analysts’ forecasting error. 
Jegadeesh et.al. (2004) show that sell-side analysts generally recommend “glamour” stocks. 
They argue that analysts add value only when the stock has favorable quantitative 
characteristics, namely value stocks and momentum stocks. Analysts prefer growth and 
momentum stocks. On the other hand, analysts dislike firms with low trading volume, high 
earnings-per-price ratio, low capital expenditures, low long-term growth opportunities and 
low sales growth measures. 
Hong et.al. (2000) have revealed several phenomena regarding analysts’ forecasting bias: the 
firm size affects strength of momentum strategies; momentum strategies work better for 
stocks with low analyst coverage; and the effect of analyst coverage is larger for stocks which 
are past losers than past winners. They argue that their findings show that the firm-specific 
information diffuses slowly to investors. This is especially true for negative information. 
Analysts should be able to value firms objectively; still they fail to revise their earlier 
estimates based on new information. 
In short, it seems clear that analysts’ recommendations do have stock market effect even 
though it might be short lived. With momentum stocks analysts’ forecasts could produce the 
most value for investors. Still sometimes it could be even reasonable to bet against analysts, 
but in that case potential investor should remember that forecasting errors have larger than 
zero variance and some risk exists. Some “glamour” stocks are much more closely followed 
than their peers. Those stocks will have larger analyst coverage and it should therefore reduce 
forecasting errors of the consensus forecast (ceteris paribus). However, those same stocks 
have characteristics that are liked by analysts which makes their forecasts overoptimistic.  
 
2.5 Do forecasts really matter? 
Now it has been noted that analysts’ forecasts are accurate (measured with standard deviation 
of the forecasting error) but they are also biased. It has been discussed whether those forecasts 
are important for financial markets. However, Copeland (2002) argues that theories and 
teachings in academia matter little if at all for reality of the firms. Earnings, EPS growth, 
economic value added and their growth rates are uncorrelated with total return to shareholders. 
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He argues that actually the difference between expected and actual performance is 
significantly related to the total return to shareholders. Expectations’ management is a tool for 
providing value to shareholders. He argues that the expectations of analysts and investors 
should be managed to be more in line with existing reality inside the firm. Copeland (2002) 
also clearly states that the management should manage expectations of the market and this can 
be done by announcements from the firm or affecting forecasts of the analysts. In other words, 
the management should have close relationship with analysts. This is usually seen as a 
relationship full of conflicts of interest. Formerly mentioned regulation changes have affected 
this relationship and guide its actions towards direct management of investors’ expectations.  
 
2.6 Literature summarized 
There are lots of researches who try to explain this upward bias or overoptimism. 
Explanations range from behavioral biases to intentionally added bias and from career 
concerns to analysts picking stocks they like. Prior literature is consistent with the fact that 
analysts’ forecasts are upward biased and this bias can be seen with publicly available 
information. The literature also is consistent that analysts’ forecasts are superior to time-series 
and forecasts of the common people. 
The very recent literature from Lim (2000) and Mest and Plummer (2003) have tried to 
explain the forecast bias as an intentionally added bias which makes it possible to get more 
accurate information from management. Recent study by de Jong and Apilado (2009) 
supports the theory of intentionally added bias. However, recently regulation has changed to 
direction which penalizes and forbids giving information to analysts selectively. At the same 
time, there has been a pressure in banking sector to make conflicts of interest more visible and 
reduce pressure on equity analysts. These topics are likely to affect analysts’ forecasting 
behavior based on earlier research. However, it is still questionable do analysts’ forecasts 
really matter in equity markets. There are lots of researches whether analysts’ forecasts can 
earn abnormal returns after risk adjustment and the results are not uniform.  
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3. Research question and hypotheses 
 
In short, my research tests the theory developed by Lim (2001) and Mest and Plummer (2003). 
They argue that analysts add bias to their forecasts in order to attain favor of the management 
and to get access to better quality information. This will improve analysts’ forecasting 
accuracy by reducing forecasting error’s standard deviation. The data they have used is prior 
year 2000 and after that there have been several changes in regulation environment which are 
likely to have an effect on analysts’ need to add bias to their forecasts intentionally. After 
2000 there should be less pressure for analysts to please management (e.g. Reg Analyst 
Certification and Global Settlement) and the management should have less possibilities to 
legally grant information selectively (e.g. Reg Fair Disclosure). The effectiveness of those 
regulatory changes has been studied for example by Heflin et.al. (2003) and Jackson and 
Madura (2007). Both of those studies argue that informational efficiency of the stock markets 
have improved. From earlier studies I draw several hypotheses for my study.  
H1: The forecast bias will be greater for a variable which is more important for management 
(i.e. earnings). Earnings forecasts are keenly followed and they are likely to affect 
management’s compensation. The bias should therefore be greater for earnings than sales 
forecasts. 
Earnings forecasts are widely followed by market and they could affect expectations of the 
investors and therefore pricing of the asset. Management’s compensation is more often linked 
to earnings or stock based measures than sales. Thus development of earnings is more 
important for a manager who maximizes his utility. For sales forecasts former relationship 
should be less solid. This was shown by Mest and Plummer (2003).  
H2: Forecast bias will be greater for firms with higher level of information uncertainty. The 
size and variability of earnings (sales) forecasts are proxy for uncertainty and are related to 
difficulty of making accurate forecasts. 
Information uncertainty affects forecast bias in two ways. First of all, it is easier to make more 
accurate forecasts in good information environment. However, if analysts are not in equal 
position and some analysts get additional information from management and in same time 
choose to add positive bias on their estimates, this results situation where analysts trade-off 
their unbiased estimates for enhance their information environment by adding intentionally 
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positive bias in their estimates. Standard deviation of the analysts’ estimates should be good 
measure for information environment because it tells us how evenly different analysts are 
informed. I am assuming that with equal access to information the analysts’ estimates should 
be closer to each other. In addition to standard deviation of the estimates, the size of the firm 
describes how much information is publicly available regardless of management’s intentions 
and it therefore should represent overall information environment. It is easier to get more 
information from large companies than from small companies and thus there is less need for 
analysts to please management for information when information environment is already 
good. Therefore, my hypothesis is that size has negative effect on forecasting bias. This was 
also finding of Lim (2001). The standard deviation of the forecasts will have with same logic 
positive relation to forecasting bias.  
H3: After changes in regulation environment, forecast bias should become smaller for 
financial measures which are more important for management. There will no longer be 
reason to add bias for earnings forecasts over sales forecasts thus reduction in forecasting 
bias should be greater for financial measure more important to the management. 
After regulation changes earnings and sales forecasts should be in equal position. If the results 
still differ after regulation changes, it could mean that firms and analysts are still doing 
forbidden cooperation - or it is just harder to forecast earnings than sales [Kim and Prather-
Kinsey (2010)]. Also, it could be rational for analysts to overreact good news when facing 
high earnings uncertainty [Gu and Xue (2007)]. Early studies from Heflin et.al. (2003) 
showed that at least price impact of the forecasts has been reduced after Reg FD.  
H4: Analysts react differently to positive and negative information.  
For example, Womack (1996) argued that analysts react slowly to new information and the 
momentum effect can be visible for a long time. Barber et.al. (2001) and Hong et.al. (2000) 
also argued for analysts’ inefficient usage of information which creates the momentum effect. 
I will try to explain consensus forecasts’ bias. I believe that analysts are professionals who 
know what they are doing and they make forecasts and their judgment errors are not related to 
their skills or experience. Of course, there may be some behavioral biases but still analysts do 
their forecast with best of their knowledge without descending into rolling a dice. However, I 
will not deny behavioral mistakes found from earlier research such as linking to Prospect 
theory [Ding et.al. (2004)]; and management use of framing to future plans after loss [Sedor 
(2002)].  
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H5: The Eurozone forecasting biases are larger compared to the U.S. markets due to less 
effective regulation and less analyst coverage. 
The Eurozone has fragmentized regulation environment and less analyst coverage. This 
results that it is much harder for analysts to produce accurate estimates. Bagella et.al. (2007) 
compared Eurozone and U.S. markets and found out that earnings forecasting errors were 
significantly higher at Eurozone markets during their research period of 1990-2001.  
Lim (2001) tried to explain forecast bias by variability of actual earnings. However, the 
method had problem that time-series for earlier earnings were always short and it was difficult 
to accept an idea that more than few years could explain nature of firm’s current state. 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997) report that analysts tend to censor their extremely negative 
forecasts and thus effectively cut the lower part of the earnings distribution away. However, 
this would not cause changes between my study periods.  
 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data 
The data is obtained via Thomson ONE Banker interface from several databases. I use 
I/B/E/S database for analysts’ quarterly and annual forecasts. It would have been possible to 
use First Call analysts’ forecast database. However, Ramnath et.al. (2005) argue that I/B/E/S 
database is superior to other competing databases when measured by quality and amount of 
the data available. They show that quality of I/B/E/S data has increased since entry of First 
Call to the earnings forecast industry at early 1990s. In forecast industry after 1993 there are 
more analyst firms doing forecasts from wide range of firms. Earlier with I/B/E/S there has 
been reported a problem whether “special items” from the balance sheet are included in 
forecast and actual numbers [Philbrick and Ricks (1991)]. It seems that earlier the data in 
I/B/E/S database has been inconsistent in the treatment of special items. The special items are 
usually write-downs which happen almost solely in the fourth fiscal quarter. This is taken in 
to account when choosing time range for this research. The data prior 1993 will not be used 
and with this decision I will be able to obtain good quality data for this study. I will also 
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discuss this possible inconsistent treatment of “special items” later on when the results are 
analyzed.  
I have obtained forecasts and actual figures at two levels: annually and quarterly. Earlier 
studies have used both datasets but they have been rarely used in the same study. However, 
there have been arguments that annual level data is higher quality than quarterly estimates 
data. These both kinds of data are recorded from the Eurozone and the U.S. markets. As I 
mentioned earlier, the one part of research question is to compare financial forecasting errors 
between different regulation environments and for this the U.S. and the Eurozone equity 
markets give magnificent opportunity. They both have highly developed financial markets 
and the firms in these markets which can be found from I/B/E/S database, are rather similar. 
The forecasts for earnings and sales are recorder 9 to 1 month prior to release of the financial 
measures.  
From databases described above I have picked all NYSE and Nasdaq firms to my U.S. 
datasets. The data from the U.S. markets is high quality and the most of the firms have long 
time-series of forecasts available. To the Eurozone sample I have picked up all firms 
Frankfurt, Paris and Berlin stock exchanges. Majority of the forecasts in I/B/E/S database are 
produced by firms operating mainly in the U.S. markets. Because of this forecasts in 
Eurozone are available only for the largest companies and often at annual level. I also require 
my data to have at least two subsequently periods of forecasts (i.e. for annual forecasts this is 
two years and for quarterly forecasts two quarters) and actual figures available. I discard 
observations when stock price is below 5 dollars. Because when stock price is entered in 
divisor, the small values would add unnecessary fluctuation and error to my sample. Putting 
all above limitations together my sample sizes are much smaller than total available 
observations with forecasts and actual figures.  
Furthermore, I use two different periods of the time-series data. The first period is from 1993 
to 2000 and second period is from 2003 to 2010. The reason for this kind of different periods 
is that between 2000 and 2003 there were several changes in regulation environment which 
could potentially affect the results. Furthermore, I am interested to study whether the 
forecasting errors are from similar kind of population. For this reason the middle period is left 
out of regression analysis. After all, the research hypothesis suggests that possibility to 
acquire exclusive information about the firm explains level of the forecasting bias. The theory 
of Lim (2001) and Mest and Plummer (2003) would suggest that there are differences 
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between before and after regulation changes which affect availability of information. This 
division to subperiods is done for the dataset containing quarterly and annual data. For annual 
level data the first sample would be extremely small and regression results would be 
insignificant or weakly significant at the best case. However, it is possible to inspect mean 
and median biases for both subperiods even with the annual data.  
Lim (2001) used quarterly data whereas Mest and Plummer (2003) used annual data. I will 
use both levels of the data in my study. With quarterly data it is possible to get 24 research 
periods of the feasible data from 1994Q4 to 2000Q4. The latter research period contains 28 
periods of the quarterly data from 2003Q1 to 2010Q1. The quarters in the middle (9) are 
discarded from analysis because during that time there occurred changes in regulation 
environment (mainly in the U.S. markets) and the main interest here is the effects of those 
changes to forecasting efficiency. Table 1 shows graphically how those research periods are 
divided.  
 
Table 1. Research period sample 
Note: First 24 periods are from 1994Q4 to 2000Q4. This will become the first subsample. The latter 
subsample contains observations from 2003Q1 to 2010Q1 (28 periods). The observations in the middle are 
discarded when I am doing analysis with subsamples. Annual forecasts are from 1993 to 2000 and from 
2003 to 2010.  
Annual periods Quarterly periods  
1993–2000 1994Q4–2000Q4 Prior regulation changes period 
2001–2002 2001Q1–2002Q4 Discarded, because there were regulation changes 
during this period 
2003–2010  2003Q1–2010Q1 After regulation changes period 
 
For example, Mest and Plummer (2003) argued that analysts only purposely add bias to their 
estimates for financial figures that matter more for the firm management. This means that 
analysts have more incentive to add additional bias to earnings forecasts than sales forecasts. I 
will also study this relationship because it is strongly related to effectiveness of the market 
regulation. At informational inefficient markets analysts have much stronger incentive to add 
bias to their forecasts in order to attain more non-public information from the firm 
management. If the markets have developed to become more efficient, then forecasting bias 
between earnings and sales should decrease. Therefore, I will obtain both earnings forecast 
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and sales forecast data for my study. I will also approximate informational efficiency of the 
markets with standard deviation of the analysts’ forecasts as a proxy. Table 2 summarizes 
different kinds of datasets I am using. All in all, I have 8 different datasets which are further 
divided at latter parts of my study.  
 
Table 2. Summary of the different datasets 
Note: The table shows how my eight different samples are constructed. The total number of samples is 
eight (2*2*2). There are earnings and sales forecast data for annual results and interim results. These sets 
are available both for the U.S. and the Eurozone markets.  
 U.S. Eurozone 
Annual data Sales Earnings Sales Earnings 
Quarterly data Sales Earnings Sales Earnings 
 
The rest of accounting items (i.e. earnings, sales, and total number of share outstanding) are 
obtained from Worldscope database which is the only available database with wide 
international coverage and exhaustive the U.S. data. For share price data I will also be using 
Worldscope database. Moreover, the Worldscope and I/B/E/S databases are readily available 
and the data from them can be easily imported to other statistical software.  
Next, I will demonstrate how my sample size evolves and explain limitations which the data 
puts on my research. Total number of active companies in NYSE is 2,773 and in Nasdaq the 
number is about 3,800. Only fraction of them has entry in I/B/E/S database. Total number of 
companies in sample is 3,165. Theoretically, there could be 193,065 observations for interim 
data. However, from the U.S. markets I start with 43,848 earnings and 24,595 sales interim 
forecast observations. In the Eurozone markets I start with 3,961 earnings and 2,307 sales 
interim forecast observations. The difference between starting sample sizes is about ten-fold. 
With annual forecast observations the difference is much smaller. I start with 14,698 earnings 
and 10,516 sales forecast observations from the U.S. markets and with 7,762 earnings and 
4,935 sales forecast observations from the Eurozone markets.  
I will choose only companies with share value higher than 5 dollars to my sample. The share 
value is used in the divisor and with small values the results would be less accurate. I also 
exclude extreme forecasting error observations on 2.5% tail areas of the distribution. This is 
done in order to get rid of outliers and cases where it is unclear whether forecast and actual 
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values are correctly reported in the database. I also require that forecast error observations 
have at least one previous forecasting error available. Last, the sample is divided based on 
“good” and “bad” news (earnings/sales surprises). The observations are arranged based on 
previous forecasting bias (see equation 3 for calculation). The third of the observations from 
the highest end of the continuum are labeled to have encountered bad news. The lowest third 
of the observations from the lower end encountered good news. The middle third has data in 
which it is unclear whether there has been positive or negative surprise. This news impact is 
later on used to explain analysts’ forecasting error. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how the 
sample sizes evolve when restrictions are implemented.   
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Figure 1. Evolution of the sample, earnings 
Note: The figure shows how different earnings samples are reduced to their final states which are later on 
used in the analysis. The left most pillars present the whole sample. Moving to the right is limitation to the 
observations with stock price over 5 dollars and next to that 2.5% percent tail-areas are removed from the 
sample. The news impact is restriction to have only observations which can be considered either good or 
bad news. Observations where information content is not clear are discarded. The final regression sample 
set is further reduced because some of the needed data items are missing. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the sample, sales 
Note: The diagram is similar to Figure 1. The figure shows how different sales samples are reduced to 
their final states which are later on used in the analysis. The left most pillars present the whole sample. 
Moving to the right is limitation to the observations with stock price over 5 dollars and next to that 2.5% 
percent tail-areas are removed from the sample. The news impact is restriction to have only observations 
which can be considered either good or bad news. Observations where information content is not clear are 
discarded. The final regression sample set is further reduced because some of the needed data items are 
missing.  
 
 
4.2 Regression model and variables 
Next, I will explain how different variables are calculated and the reasons for choosing 
applied calculation method. First and the most important variable will be the forecasting error. 
The absolute forecasting error is depending on the size of a firm and there is huge variation in 
size of firms. Without any adjustment the size of the firm could easily affect the obtained 
results; for large firms $10 million error in forecast can be small but for smaller one it can be 
an enormous error. Therefore, in order to reduce heteroscedasticity Lim (2001) suggests 
calculating forecasts and forecasting errors as a percentage of the share price at the beginning 
of the quarter. I will employ same method and use the closing price at the beginning of the 
observation month in divisor. Following equation shows how this is done in practice  
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  𝐹𝐸% =
𝐹𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡−𝐴𝐶𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡
    (3) 
where FE% is forecast error of consensus forecast as percentage of share price; FC is 
forecasted value; ACi is actual value of the metric for the period; and Pi is a share price at the 
beginning of the forecasting quarter. The median forecast is taken as a consensus forecast as 
have been done in researches of Lim (2001) and Mest and Plummer (2003). Forecasts are 
generally offered in earnings-per-share format. For sales I have to first calculate sales-per-
share ratio.  
Second important variable is size of the firm as a proxy for information environment. Size is 
measured as logarithm of the market capitalization. There are two main reasons for use of 
market capitalization as a measure for the size instead of assets’ value or book value of the 
equity. First, some industries are more capital intensive than others and balance sheet would 
not give unbiased estimate for firm’s potential to generate profits for its owners. Second, I am 
using analysts’ forecasts for earnings which are calculated after capital costs for debtholders. 
It would be possible to use total firm value instead of just market value of the equity. 
However, then capital structure would affect results because I would have one measure before 
costs on capital and other one after costs on capital. In addition, earlier research by Lim 
(2001) used analyst coverage as a measure for information environment. However, in this 
study I don’t use analyst coverage as explaining variable because it has high correlation with 
size and would cause problems in regression. This could potentially cause coefficients for size 
and analyst coverage to be falsely interpreted as insignificant. 
Third regressed variable is variance of prior earnings (sales) forecast. Earlier research done by 
Lim (2001) and Mest and Plummer (2003) has found out that variance of the earnings (sales) 
is barely significant and it might be possible to left out of the regression. Still it will be 
included in regression because most of the earlier researches have used it and theoretically it 
should affect difficulty of making accurate forecasts.  
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Figure 3. Contraction of the sample based on nature of the observed news impact 
Note: forecasting errors are arranged in ascending order. The highest one third contains the observations 
in which analysts overestimated the financial results the most and this is interpret as that there are some 
bad news which were not available in the market. Similar way the lowest one third contains cases in which 
analysts were surprised by some good news and they underestimated the financial results. Based on this I 
give my observations two dummy variables GoodNews and BadNews.  
 
 
It has been pointed out that analysts respond differently to the most extreme positive and 
negative prior year forecast biases. For this reason I add dummy variables for clearly positive 
and negative forecast errors (e.g. earnings surprises or disappointments). The dummy 
variables are defined in following way. Forecast errors for current year earnings and sales are 
arranged based on prior year forecast error (see Figure 3). The bottom third (dark grey at 
bottom in Figure 3) consists the forecast errors of the cases where analysts’ forecasts were too 
low and actual results were more positive than expected. This is considered good news and 
those observations are given 1 for GoodNews dummy variable. The top third (light grey at 
upmost in Figure 3) consists the forecast errors of the cases where actual results were 
disappoints compared to analysts’ forecast. Those firms will receive 1 for BadNews dummy 
variable. The observations of the middle third (light grey at middle in Figure 3) are ones 
where prior year forecasts were fairly accurate and they cannot be categorized either to good 
nor bad news. In those cases analysts do not need to learn from prior errors and therefore 
those forecasts are not likely to have clear implications for the current forecasts. In order to 
make analysis more simply and the model easier to handle those observations are left out of 
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the regression analysis. Only bottom and top third of the observations are used for the 
regression analysis. 
 
4.3 Model 
My model has been developed based on findings of Lim (2001), Mest and Plummer (2003) 
and Kini et.al. (2009). Lim (2001) suggests that positive bias in analysts’ forecasts is actually 
logical and describes information environment of the firm. For more accurate forecasts the 
analysts needs access to insider information which is only available from the management. 
They positively bias their estimates in order to gain better access to those resources. In the 
optimal situation their forecast accuracy increases even with added bias (see equation 2). 
However, public information amount differs from company to company. It is easier to get 
more information from large companies than from smaller ones (see hypothesis H2). 
Mest and Plummer (2003) argued that analysts may positively bias their forecast but they add 
bias only to the values which matter to management. The earnings forecasts are more 
important to management than sales forecasts. This thinking rises from the idea that earnings 
forecasts are likely to have an effect on a stock price and thus have an effect on compensation 
of the management. First, I will study whether biases for sales and earnings forecasts are 
different. This is done by running two different regressions: one for earnings and other one for 
sales. The regressions are run separately for both time periods. The results are then tested 
whether they come from same population or are differences statistically significant. 
Figure 4 shows how values are gathered from three different time points for an observation. 
Let us look how different time points are used in analysis through an example. At 2003Q1 I 
record forecast for 2003Q2. This forecast is used to measure prior forecast error for regression. 
At 2003Q2 I calculate analysts’ forecast error after actual values are available. Same time I 
also record forecast for period 2003Q3. At 2003Q4 current forecast error is measured and this 
value is used in my regression as an explained variable. Other variables such as market 
capitalization and variance of the prior earnings are measured at 2003Q4 which is the point t 
in the Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Graph of how data is gathered from different periods 
Note: The prior forecasting error is needed for regression analysis and therefore there has to be time 
series data available at least at three time points. Analysts’ consensus estimate is observed approximately 
one month prior release of the financial results. With actual financial measure and the observed consensus 
estimate it is possible to calculate forecasting error. In my regression model current forecasting error is 
explained by previous forecasting error and other variables. Two periods of forecasting errors are needed 
for observation to enter my sample.  
 
 
The forecast error is explained by market capitalization, previous forecasting error, and 
historical variability of sales/earnings forecasts. In empirical analysis I use multivariate 
regression model similar to the one used by Mest and Plummer (2003). I am using current 
quarter’s forecast error as a dependent variable which is explained by prior quarter forecast 
error, news impact and variables that are proxy for the firm’s informational uncertainty (i.e. 
market value of equity and variability of earnings/sales forecasts). The Equation 4 describes 
the model used to regress variables (earnings forecasting error and sales forecasting error). 
Following model is used separately for sales and earnings forecast errors at both quarter and 
annual level: 
𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖 ,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +
𝛼4𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖 ,𝑡    (4) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡  is the forecast error of the consensus forecast for the period t; FEi,t-1 is forecast 
error for prior period (t -1); GoodNewsi,t-1 and BadNewsi,t-1 are dummy variables for the prior 
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period forecast surprise defined earlier (positive or negative); MVEi,t-1 is the logarithm of the 
market value of the equity for firm is measured at the forecast date; and VARi,t is historical 
variability of the sales or the earnings depending on which regression is in question. The 
forecast errors are calculated with equation 1. 
Usually regression model contains a constant term. However, this model does not have the 
constant term because every single observation has either GoodNews or BadNews dummy 
value of one and thus intercept terms α1 and α2 can be considered as constants and they 
measure basic forecasting bias not related to any other factor in the model. If the intercept 
terms α1 and α2 are different from zero, this is indication that on average analysts’ forecasts 
are biased. The positive value would mean that forecasts are on average too positive whereas 
negative intercept would mean that forecasts are biases downward.  
The intercept α3 is the FEi,t-1 slope coefficient for GoodNews and α4 is the FEi,t-1 slope 
coefficient for BadNews. Always when these coefficients (α3 and α4) are different from zero 
the analysts are not fully adjusting their estimates to new information available. If they used 
information efficiently prior forecasting errors should not be related to current forecasting 
errors and coefficients would be statistically insignificant. If both coefficients are positive (α3 
> 0 and α4 > 0), it would indicate that analysts underreact to forecast errors in the past. After 
good news analysts are still too negative whereas after bad news they their forecasts are too 
high. If both coefficients are negative (α3 < 0 and α4 < 0), it would mean that analysts 
generally overreact and forecast revision is too large. That is, after positive information 
forecasts are generally too high and after negative information forecasts tend to become too 
low. The negative value for α3 and positive value for α4 would be consistent with existing 
literature that analysts overreact to positive information and underreact to negative 
information. Hong et.al. (2000) show that stock price momentum effects are stronger and 
more persistent for poor performers, indicating that bad news diffuses more slowly than good 
news to the investing public. 
Market value of equity (MVE) and variance of the past earnings/sales (VAR) are trying to 
capture information environment of the firm. For large firms there is more information 
available and forecasts should therefore be more accurate than with smaller firms. With larger 
companies there should be less information asymmetry between analysts. As the variability of 
the financial measure increases, the uncertainty around firm increases and the forecasting 
becomes increasingly difficult. I expected that the coefficient for MVE (α5) will be negative, 
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which effectively means that there is less information uncertainty with large companies. I 
expect that the coefficient for VAR (α6) is positive which is consistent with hypothesis that 
increased difficulty of making accurate forecasts increases forecasting bias. This can also be 
interpreted so that analysts will add more positive bias under high uncertainty to buy more 
information from the management. This will effectively be a test for hypothesis H2.  
However, Engle and Granger (1987) show that traditional regression tests are inefficient and 
can lead to erroneous conclusions if time-series are non-stationary and follow unit root 
process. De Jong and Apilado (2009) argue that this is usually case with earnings series and 
therefore cointegration methods should be used. I am not using earnings or sales measures as 
such but rather I take difference between forecast and actual value. I make conservative 
assumption that expected value of forecast equal actual realized value. Thus the measure is 
integrated of order one which usually is enough to cure non-stationary time series problem.  
 
 
5. Analysis and results 
 
5.1 Descriptive results 
As was already noted in previous section my data set consists of systematic forecasting errors 
which indicate that analysts produce biased estimates. However, it is yet to be finding out 
which factors affect that those biases and how those biases evolve over time in the U.S. and 
the Eurozone. I will first go through my findings about analysts’ forecasting bias at general 
level. After that I will study evolution of the forecasting bias over the years and finally I will 
try to explain some of the reasons behind the forecasting biases with regression analysis. 
Figure 5 shows how annual average forecasting bias evolves from 1995 to beginning of 2010 
in Eurozone. Euronext 100 index is used as approximation of the markets’ development. The 
figure shows that there are clearly period when analysts’ forecasts become less reliable and 
forecasting errors grow sharply. Other observation is that analysts’ forecasts tend to become 
more volatile at times when direction of the market is turning. This seems to be truth in 
European markets. Figure 6 shows how forecasting bias has evolved from 1995 to 2010 in 
markets in the United States. My sample is combined from stocks in NYSE and Nasdaq. 
Therefore the figure contains indices for both of those exchanges. The very same conclusions 
34 
 
can be drawn from the figure: distribution of the forecasting error grows at the turning point 
of the markets; since year 1995 average forecasting errors have not changed much however 
their distribution has grown slightly. In both figures it seems that forecasting errors standard 
deviation grows much more when declining market starts to recover. Bagella et.al. (2007) 
showed that during stock market boom in 1997-2000 forecasting bias is relatively higher at 
the U.S. markets compared to the Eurozone. Usually stock market development is correlated 
with real economic development of the underlying firms. My observations that forecasting 
errors increase with changes in stock markets, is in line with findings of Chopra (1998). 
Standard deviation and accuracy of analysts’ forecasts is affected by realized growth rates 
[Chopra (1998)]. Many studies have found out that analysts’ forecasting errors are correlated 
with prior stock returns [e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Chan et.al. (1996)]. This 
makes analysts’ forecasts inefficient and above figures (Figure 5 and Figure 6) show clearly 
that distribution of forecasting errors widens when stock market returns are suddenly 
changing. These results are true with forecasts targeting full financial year.  
Next, I will study how forecasting biases have evolved for analysts’ quarter forecasts. Figure 
7 shows quarterly earnings forecasting biases in the U.S. markets over research period. In the 
U.S. markets forecasting errors make four large spikes which should be removed from Figure 
7 in order to get clearer picture of how forecasting errors have truly developed over time. 
Those spikes are all located at the points when direction of the market has been changing (see 
Figure 6). Especially the spike at end of the year 2008 made analysts hugely overestimate the 
earnings of the firms. After excluding those observations from very special occasions we get 
Figure 8. There it is possible to see that there is a small rise in the level of the forecasting bias 
at 2000 at that point of time Regulation of Fair Disclosure was implemented. Williams and 
McGough (2000) argue that Reg. FD reduces information available and would lead to wider 
distribution of the forecasts and more surprises. From Figure 8 it seems that the forecast was 
true and analysts’ estimates have become more volatile since year 2000. Figure 9 and Figure 
10 are similar graphs for forecasting error evolution at the Eurozone markets. First of all it 
should be noted that there are a lots of more spikes. After removing those spikes as outliers 
there is not clear development visible. In the U.S. markets there were clear increase in the 
variability of the earnings forecasting errors and a slight increase in the mean forecasting error 
but in the Eurozone there has not been any single visible change. In the U.S. and the Eurozone 
markets level of forecasting errors seems to about similar when observed from the pictures. 
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From this I will conclude that there has been some kind of change at the beginning of the year 
in the U.S. markets. Similar kind of change is not visible in the Eurozone markets.  
 
Figure 5. Analysts’ forecasting bias in Europe compared to performance of the market index 
Note: The figure shows average earnings forecasting biases and 90 percent confidence intervals for 
forecasting biases assuming that the distribution is normal. The data is from annual forecasting errors for 
the Eurozone. Euronext100 index is used as approximation of the underlying market’s development. This 
index is only available since 2001. Left-hand side scale is for forecasting errors and right-hand side scale is 
for index values.  
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Figure 6. Forecasting bias in the U.S. compared to market indices 
Note: The figure shows average earnings forecasting biases and 90 percent confidence intervals for 
forecasting biases assuming that the distribution is normal. Forecasting errors for firms in Nasdaq and 
NYSE are pooled together to make graphical presentation simpler. It can also be noted that Nasdaq and 
NYSE indices follow each other quite tightly and therefore this pooling method does not cause any 
significant loss of information. Left-hand side scale is for forecasting errors and right-hand side scale is 
for index values. The indices are standardized to start from value 100. This is done because indices cannot 
be shown in same scale.  
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Figure 7. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time, earnings, the U.S. 
Note: The figure contains earnings forecasting errors for quarters in the U.S. markets. Five spikes make 
the figure harder to comprehend. Forecasting errors are calculated as percentage of stock price. The data 
in figure contains whole data sample even with outliers which are excluded from regression analysis.  
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Figure 8. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time without outliers, earnings, the U.S. 
Note: The figure contains earnings forecasting errors for quarters in the U.S. markets. The major spikes 
from Figure 7 are excluded in order to show forecasting bias evolution more in-depth. Those spikes are 
from periods Q3Y2002, Q4Y2003, Q1Y2006, Q3Y2008 and Q4Y2008. It can be seen that forecasting 
errors have become more volatile after year 2003.  
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Figure 9. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time, earnings, the Eurozone 
Note: The figure contains earnings forecasting errors for quarters in the Eurozone markets. Forecasting 
errors are calculated as percentage of stock price. There are far less observations for European firms 
compared to U.S. ones which might make forecasting error mean more volatile.  
 
Figure 10. Quarterly forecasting error evolution over time without outliers, earnings, the Eurozone 
Note: The figure contains earnings forecasting errors for quarters in the Eurozone markets. Forecasting 
errors are calculated as percentage of stock price. Extreme outliers excluded are from periods Q2Y2003, 
Q3Y2008, Q4Y2008 and Q1Y2009. 
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Analysts make forecast for interim and annual financial periods. It is widely held belief that 
analysts make more efforts to polish their annual forecasts than quarterly forecasts. After 
qualitative analysis of the forecasting biases let us take a look to real numbers behind the 
phenomena. Table 4 summarizes descriptive statistics for my annual level datasets for the U.S. 
and the Eurozone. Similarly Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the quarter forecasts.  
Approximately, the amount of observations is twice as large in the U.S. compared to the 
Eurozone. That is understandable because most of the analysts producing estimates to I/B/E/S 
are from North American institutes and therefore they have more interests on their local firms. 
However, on average level differences in earnings and sales are quite small and even standard 
deviations are very close to each others. Therefore, I will judge that underlying firms are quite 
similar in both markets.  
A quick glance on data shows that on average forecasting errors are larger for earnings 
estimates than sales estimates (see Table 4 and Table 3). It seems that errors on sales forecasts 
are less variable than errors on earnings forecasts. Standard deviations of the sales forecasting 
errors for sales estimates are larger than for earnings estimates. One simple explanation for 
this is that sales have naturally larger variability than earnings which are part of the sales.  
Even though sales estimates are harder to make (higher standard deviation), still they are on 
average more accurate than earnings estimates. The only exception is the hugely 
underestimated annual figures in the U.S. markets.  
On average earnings estimates are 0.1 percent too large in the U.S. markets; whereas they are 
whopping 0.8 percent overoptimistic in the Eurozone markets. Quarterly estimates have lower 
quality because analysts use less time and resources for quarterly estimates. Therefore it is 
natural that forecasting biases for earnings are larger with quarterly data (0.5 percent in the 
U.S. and 1.4 percent in the Eurozone). However, in both markets for earnings and for sales 
median forecasting error is close to zero. This hints that forecasts could be potentially 
unbiased. Whenever mean and median are not equal it is clear that distribution is not normal. 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) studied distribution of the forecasting errors and found out that 
two asymmetries; tail asymmetry (large number of extreme negative forecasting errors 
relative to extreme positive forecasting error); and middle asymmetry (large number of small 
positive forecasting errors relative to small negative forecasting errors). My annual dataset is 
mostly consistent with findings of Arabanell and Lehavy (2003). Gu and Wu (2003) argue 
that optimal forecast is the median instead of mean when underlying distribution is skewed. 
At annual level it seems to hold that the median is closer unbiased situation than the mean.  
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When comparing the forecasting biases between the U.S. and the Eurozone it is clear that the 
forecasting biases are consistently higher in the Eurozone markets. Once again only exception 
is the sales estimates in the U.S. This could only be due some very unusual situation under 
which analysts have encountered lots of positive surprises and failed to update their estimates 
to match the reality. It is likely that earnings forecasts are updated more often because they 
are likely to affect more stock markets. As in many earlier studies standard deviation of the 
earnings forecasting errors are smaller in the U.S. markets which implies that there are more 
public information available and higher analyst coverage. Another observation is that 
forecasting errors are slightly larger for interim reports (compare Table 4 and Table 3). Also 
standard deviations of the forecasting errors are larger at quarterly level. It has been argued 
that analysts use more effort on annual estimates than quarterly ones and my findings seem to 
support that idea.  
Hypothesis 1 stated that forecasting bias would be larger for the financial variable more 
important for the management (namely earnings). This seems to be true based on results in 
Table 3 and Table 4. Hypothesis 5 stated that forecasting errors would be higher in the 
Eurozone markets. This is confirmed in Table 3 and Table 4. Later on we will see that this is 
due higher uncertainty and less developed regulation environment.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, quarterly dataset 
Note: The analysts’ forecasts are recorded approximately one month before financial figures are 
published. The firms whose financial reporting periods are different from Jan-Mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Sep and 
Oct-Dec are excluded from the sample. This reduces amount of firms especially in Europe where financial 
periods are less standardized. The percentage forecast errors are calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – 
Actual] / Market value of the equity).  
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 44263 105.6961 22.75380 374.3018 
Earnings, EU 2896 178.7668 12.98095 603.5458 
Sales, U.S. 24580 1785.288 484.0225 4840.837 
Sales, EU 2294 3425.618 482.2510 7517.937 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 44263 0.005309 -0.005309 0.233362 
Earnings, EU 2896 0.013670 0.000000 0.117098 
Sales, U.S. 24580 0.003269 -0.000978 0.328576 
Sales, EU 2294 0.008556 -0.002107 0.331176 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, annual dataset 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for firms’ actual reported earnings and sales at annual level but without 
outliers. An observation enters into the sample when it has analyst forecast and actual reported data 
available.  However, observations which could be regarded outliers or cases where it is not clear whether 
data in database is correct or it is not clear what analysts’ have tried to forecast, are excluded. I have 
excluded data from 5% tail-areas of the distribution and cases when stock price is below 5 dollars. I 
exclude the observations with low stock price because it will be then consistent with limitations 
implemented for data later on when I develop my regression models. The percentage forecast errors are 
calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the equity).  
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 13863 430.7045 95.36325 1504.484 
Earnings, EU 6455 283.2252 17.32551 1176.139 
Sales, U.S. 9766 5936.839 1622.335 17204.12 
Sales, EU 4069 7166.216 491.9741 20305.61 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 13863 0.001218 -0.000310 0.016753 
Earnings, EU 6455 0.008767 -0.000139 0.064202 
Sales, U.S. 9766 -1.053283 -0.740367 1.021793 
Sales, EU 4069 0.007328 -0.007294 0.374944 
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5.2 Evolution of the forecasting bias 
In this section I will go through how forecasting biases have evolved in the markets under the 
research. It has been documented behavior that forecasts tend to converge nearer realized 
values when approaching the release date because more information becomes available. 
Figure 11 compares how the annual forecasting errors behave when release date comes closer. 
In the U.S. markets behavior is as expected and forecasting errors decrease. This could be 
because more information becomes available and there will be less uncertainty about time 
period still left before end of the financial year. At the Eurozone markets same kind of 
convergence process is not present. The data in Figure 11 is over my whole research period 
from 1995 to 2009 and therefore it cannot be that some kind of business cycle explanation 
would be possible because my data is extended over business cycle. Also it is not likely that 
those European companies do not have enough analyst coverage because they are mainly the 
largest companies in their markets. The only explanation I could come up is that data quality 
is weaker at the Eurozone markets and companies do not publish as much information about 
themselves as corresponding companies at the U.S. markets. This finding is in line with 
findings from Bagella et.al. (2007).  
Figure 11 showed only summarized result of how forecasting biases converge over time. Now, 
I will move on to Figure 12 which present how those monthly forecasting errors have changed 
over years. There is only one period during which forecasting errors have been lower in the 
Eurozone than in the U.S. markets. This period is from 2004 to 2007. When comparing 
graphs in Figure 12 it becomes clear that forecasting errors are much more volatile in the 
Eurozone markets. This is the same finding as Bagella et.al. (2007) presented. The graphs also 
show that from two to three months prior to release of financial year results the Eurozone 
forecasts during research period never become superior to forecasts in the U.S. markets. Left 
side scales show that forecasts become more accurate but the earnings forecasts at the U.S. 
markets do it at much quicker pace. Still, positive news is that it seems that forecasting errors 
are developing more and more hand in hand between the U.S. and the Eurozone markets. This 
signals that the U.S. and the Eurozone markets are getting more integrated.  
To this point I have mainly discussed about accuracy of the earnings and sales forecasts. In 
next step instead of studying levels of the forecast error, I concentrate on variability of the 
earnings forecast errors. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show development of forecasting error’s 
standard deviation (the dispersion of the forecasting errors) for several years. In the U.S. 
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markets analysts become more and more to agreement on the level of the consensus estimate 
when approaching the release date. This is seen from negative slope in Figure 13. From same 
figure it can be seen that standard deviation of consensus forecasts becomes smaller and 
smaller over years. The results are similar even for the years not shown in the Figure 13. With 
the U.S. data year 2009 is surprise because standard deviation jumps to levels where is has not 
been before. This is probably due the turnaround in business cycle which increases 
forecasting errors. It also increases analysts’ disagreement because some analysts were able to 
forecast the turn and some missed that one. Figure 14 tells us very different story than earlier 
Figure 13 about the U.S. markets. In the Eurozone markets there is not clear development 
towards agreement over months towards the release date. Also there is not same kind of 
development towards tighter forecast distribution visible. It seems that development of the 
forecasting error is random-walk or at least close of it. As noted earlier, average forecasting 
biases have started to move more together. However, the distribution of the forecasting bias 
has not converged which effectively means that the U.S. and the Eurozone markets still are 
very different from the viewpoint of analyst. This will be further studied when I next divide 
the study period to two sub-periods, 1994-2000 and 2003-2010.  
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Figure 11. Development of the forecasting bias when release date gets closer, annual dataset 
Note: The figure is mean of the earnings forecasting errors over years from 1994 to 2009. Forecasting 
errors are mean forecasting errors. Forecasting errors are calculated 1 to 9 months prior release of the 
annual earnings. The percentage forecast errors are calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / 
Market value of the equity).  
 
 
Figure 12. Forecasting bias evolution for earnings forecasts from 9 months to 1 month prior release date 
of the financial measure. 
Note: The figure shows how forecasting errors have developed over years for certain months prior release 
of the annual earnings numbers. The figure contains only data from earnings forecasting errors because 
number of observations for individual month prior the release date for sales forecasts was quite a low. The 
percentage forecast errors are calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the 
equity).  
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Figure 12 continues  
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Figure 13. Evolution of the standard deviation of the forecasting errors in the U.S. 
Note: The figure standard deviations of the earnings forecasting errors in the U.S. markets. Only several 
years of the observations were chosen for this figure. The figure describes how the standard deviation of 
the forecasting error for earnings evolves from 9 to 1 month prior release of the annual figures. Tendency 
of the forecasting error’s distribution to shrink when reaching the most recent year still exists even for 
years not presented here.  
 
 
Figure 14. Evolution of the standard deviation of the forecasting errors in the Eurozone 
Note: The figure standard deviations of the earnings forecasting errors in the Eurozone markets. The 
figure describes how the standard deviation of the forecasting error for earnings evolves from 9 to 1 
month prior release of the annual figures.  
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Next, I will divide annual data to subperiods; 1995-2000 and 2003-2009. Between years 
2000-2003 there were several regulation changes which are likely to have an effect on 
analysts forecasting. I have collected descriptive statistics of annual forecasts on Table 5 and 
Table 6. Let us remember that at latter period analysts in the U.S. no longer get additional 
information from the management which is not made already publicly available. Table 9 
shows how mean forecasting biases have changed between periods. Judging from Table 9 the 
sales estimates have become increasingly accurate, whereas earnings forecasts have become 
less accurate. Four possible explanations come in mind: (1) analyst coverage has increased 
and made consensus forecasts more accurate; (2) analysts have improved their processing of 
information; (3) different part of the business cycle has changed difficulty of forecasting; or 
(4) regulation changes have affected purposely added bias on analysts’ forecasts.  
First explanation, the analyst coverage has surely increased but it should make forecasting 
markets more efficient in sales and earnings. Therefore, forecasting accuracy improvement 
should be similar to both variables. Table 9 shows that improvement in forecasting accuracy 
has been much greater with sales than earnings. Second explanation does not sound very 
reasonable. It states that analysts have changed and earlier they had little idea what they were 
doing. Third explanation clearly is not true if we look situation of the business cycle from 
Figure 5 and Figure 6. Clearly at earlier period there was less fluctuation than the latter period. 
In other words, it seems that it should be harder to make accurate forecasts at 2003-2009 
periods. The fourth explanation states that regulation changes would affect forecasting 
accuracy to one direction or other. I argue that the difference of the change between earnings 
and sales forecasting errors could be used as approximation for the effectiveness of the 
regulation changes.  
Same time earnings forecasts have become less accurate and their standard deviation of the 
forecasting error has increased. It is puzzling if we observe increasing accuracy in sales 
forecasts but loss of accuracy in earnings forecasts. It might be that earnings forecasts 
accuracy has depreciated because there are firms who are careful not to reveal additional 
information over publicly available information. Still after increase in forecasting error for 
earnings, the standard deviation has also increased. The analysts have to rely more on publicly 
available information. This information might be inaccurate sometimes and cause greater 
forecasting errors and standard deviation. But it does not explain why forecasting errors are 
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increasingly positive. Could it be that “price” of insider information from the management has 
increased and the analysts have to add more bias to their estimates in order to get access to 
management’s information?  
Table 7 and Table 8 present descriptive statistics for subperiods just like earlier with annual 
datasets. Here we have very interesting results. When measured with mean forecasting bias 
earnings forecasts have become less accurate both in the Eurozone and the U.S. markets. 
However, median forecasting errors are still close to zero. At the U.S. markets median and 
mean forecasting errors have moved to opposite directions thus making forecasting error 
distribution even more skewed. Earlier with the annual dataset and now with the quarterly 
dataset it seems that sales forecasts are continuously underestimated except in the Eurozone 
markets. In the Eurozone it is puzzling that on annual level sales estimates are underestimated 
but on interim level they are on average overestimated. With quarterly data I make same 
finding as Mest and Plummer (2003) that standard deviation of sales forecast errors are 
smaller compared to earnings forecast errors. Also absolute forecasting errors are with 
quarterly data in both time periods lower for sales. Mest and Plummer (2003) argued that 
those findings together show that analysts purposely add bias on their earnings estimates. The 
story is same with annual and quarterly datasets. The direction and the magnitude of the 
change can be seen from the Table 9.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 1995-2000, annual  dataset 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for firms’ actual reported earnings and sales at annual level. An 
observation enters into the sample when it has analyst forecast and actual reported data available. The 
dataset is sliced to subperiod which consists time before Regulation Fair Disclosure and tightening of 
regulatory environment. The Table 5 contains data for financial years from 1995 to 2000. The percentage 
forecast errors are calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the equity). 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 4964 312.0032 77.98189 880.0827 
Earnings, EU 2284 205.6604 12.33623 1019.960 
Sales, U.S. 1470 5757.610 1770.700 13891.01 
Sales, EU 1063 7064.045 566.6685 20823.28 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 4964 0.000469 -0.000263 0.008335 
Earnings, EU 2284 0.016276 0.001742 0.065286 
Sales, U.S. 1470 -1.141772 -0.740966 1.218215 
Sales, EU 1063 -5.385765 0.283997 30.31322 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 2003-2009, annual dataset 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for firms’ actual reported earnings and sales at annual level. An 
observation enters into the sample when it has analyst forecast and actual reported data available. After 
year 2003 majority of regulation changes have been implemented (Regulation Fair Disclosure at 2000 and 
Global Settlement 2003) and the results of those regulation changes should have become visible. The Table 
6 contains data for financial years from 2003 to 2009. The percentage forecast errors are calculated with 
Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the equity). 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 7159 528.1505 113.5951 1855.881 
Earnings, EU 3454 370.3809 24.14569 1323.993 
Sales, U.S. 6876 6072.272 1578.960 18546.95 
Sales, EU 2466 7480.447 491.3240 21164.71 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 7159 0.001168 -0.000400 0.020725 
Earnings, EU 3454 0.001476 -0.001474 0.048110 
Sales, U.S. 6876 -1.020815 -0.727958 0.972999 
Sales, EU 2466 -4.392683 0.410622 24.94739 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 1994-2000, quarterly dataset 
Note: The analysts’ forecasts are recorded approximately one month before financial figures are 
published. The firms whose financial reporting periods are different from Jan-Mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Sep and 
Oct-Dec are excluded from the sample. This reduces amount of firms especially in Europe where financial 
periods are less standardized. Amount of Europe based firms drop dramatically because I/B/E/S mainly 
reports annual figures before year 2000 for European firms. The percentage forecast errors are calculated 
with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the equity).  
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 15145 75.93581 17.23995 212.5783 
Earnings, EU 449 47.76676 1.688600 158.7327 
Sales, U.S. 1053 1420.323 494.0000 3833.277 
Sales, EU 88 377.0035 26.09200 968.0036 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 15145 0.001031 -0.000131 0.021252 
Earnings, EU 449 0.003110 0.000000 0.024408 
Sales, U.S. 1053 0.004529 -0.000219 0.206744 
Sales, EU 88 0.010540 -0.000479 0.133468 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for subperiod 2003-2009, quarterly data 
Note: The analysts’ forecasts are recorded approximately one month before financial figures are 
published. The firms whose financial reporting periods are different from Jan-Mar, Apr-Jun, Jul-Sep and 
Oct-Dec are excluded from the sample. This reduces amount of firms especially in Europe where financial 
periods are less standardized. Since financial year 2000 I/B/E/S has improved its international coverage 
and therefore the amounts of the observations from the Eurozone is much larger than with earlier time 
period 1994-2000. The difference between amounts of observations between U.S. and Europe reduces 
because there are a lot of more analysts covering also European stock markets. The percentage forecast 
errors are calculated with Equation 3 ([Forecast – Actual] / Market value of the equity). 
 N Mean Median Std. dev. 
Panel A: Actual reported values (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 24903 125.9069 27.00033 454.7825 
Earnings, EU 2330 210.8299 22.04897 666.0453 
Sales, U.S. 21968 1795.652 476.3730 4906.039 
Sales, EU 2153 3630.503 544.6919 7712.084 
Panel B: Percentage forecast errors (in millions of dollars) 
Earnings, U.S. 24903 0.008560 -0.000447 0.310173 
Earnings, EU 2330 0.017089 0.000112 0.130160 
Sales, U.S. 21968 0.002525 -0.001072 0.335161 
Sales, EU 2153 0.009684 -0.002439 0.340758 
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Table 9. Forecasting accuracy percentage change from 1995-2000 to 2003-2009 
Note: The table contains percentage changes in forecasting bias between the earlier and the latter periods. 
The changes are calculated with figures from Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 as (FE_period2-
FE_period1)/FE_period1. Negative numbers mean that forecasting error has reduced.  
 U.S. Eurozone 
Earnings, annual +149% -90.9% 
Earnings, quarterly +730% +44.9% 
Sales, annual -10.6% -18.4% 
Sales, quarterly -44% -8% 
 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 show average forecasting error for earnings and sales for Eurozone 
and U.S. markets arranged by financial quarter. There have been arguments that I/B/E/S 
might have inconsistent treatment of the so called special items of the income statement. 
These special items are usually write-downs and other non-cash flow items. Often those 
special items lower reported earnings and could possible cause over-estimation of the 
earnings. Following Figure 15 and Figure 16 study this potentiality. Sales forecasts should not 
contain this special items problem and therefore they can be used as comparison point. Sales 
forecasting errors in U.S. markets are effectively equal for 3
rd
 and 4
th
 financial quarters with 
sales but this equality does not hold with earnings. There is a sharp increase in over-optimism 
at 4
th
 financial quarter this could be partly because of “special items” lower actual reported 
earnings and analysts have not prepared to forecast those earnings with special items included. 
In Eurozone sample there seems to be even decline in forecasting error magnitude and 
therefore I have admit that “special items” are not affecting my sample in great detail.  
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Figure 15. Quarterly forecasting bias of earnings for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms 
Note: The figure contains mean quarterly earnings forecasting errors for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms 
over whole research period from 1994Q4 to 2010Q1. Possible outliers are still included as was done earlier. 
Horizontal-axis has fiscal quarters from first quarter (Jan-Mar) to fourth quarter (Oct-Dec). Fourth 
quarter might contain special items which are not treated consistently in I/B/E/S before year 2000. 
Forecasting errors are measured approximately one month prior release of the interim figures.  
 
 
Figure 16. Quarterly forecasting bias of Sales for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms 
Note: The figure contains mean quarterly sales forecasting errors for the U.S. and the Eurozone firms 
over whole research period from 1994Q4 to 2010Q1.  Mean forecasting biases for quarter as percentage of 
stock price are calculated as weighted average. Weights used are number of observations for certain 
quarter in certain year. The forecasting errors are calculated approximately one month prior release of 
the financial figures for quarter.  
 
0,0 %
0,2 %
0,4 %
0,6 %
0,8 %
1,0 %
1,2 %
1,4 %
1,6 %
1,8 %
2,0 %
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
US
EU
-2 %
-1 %
0 %
1 %
2 %
3 %
4 %
5 %
6 %
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
US
EU
54 
 
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
I will answer rest of the research questions with regression analysis. I will incorporate several 
well-known sources of forecasting bias to my regression equation. It is very close to one used 
by Mest and Plummer (2003). However, I have discarded analyst coverage variable because 
there is high autocorrelation between analyst coverage and market capitalization of the firm. 
Those potential sources of analysts’ forecasting bias have to be controlled in order to reveal 
true relationships from the data. Instead of I will be using analysts’ forecasts standard 
deviation. See equation 4 for regression function.  
Table 10 contains regression results for earnings forecast errors obtained from quarterly and 
annual datasets. Several notes from the results should be made. There is positive bias 
(intercept term) in every sample regardless of the prior forecasting error and news impact. The 
degree of the prior forecasting bias is statistically significant and the coefficients (α3 and α4) 
are different for negative and positive news impact. The analysts therefore react differently to 
positive and negative surprises and furthermore they are slow to revise their forecast. The size 
of the firm has negative effect to forecasting bias as expected because there is more 
information available about larger firms. The standard deviation of earlier forecasts has 
mostly significant positive coefficient. This is surprising because it means that larger the 
analysts opinions dispersion is, larger will be average forecasting bias. I will analyze these 
intercepts and coefficients again later on when I divide my sample to two periods 1994-2000 
and 2003-2009.  
From Table 10  we can see that intercept terms (α1 and α2) for prior good and bad news are 
positive. This shows an average level of forecasting bias before any other variable taken in the 
account. Forecasting bias is positive in the Eurozone and the U.S. markets from both annual 
and interim datasets. Positive earnings surprises earlier affect forecasting accuracy. 
Forecasting bias is larger in the Eurozone and the U.S. markets with quarterly data which is as 
expected. With annual forecasts analysts have over half of a year time adjust their estimates to 
correct mistakes made earlier. Whereas with interim estimates have to be done in two months. 
Also analysts use more energy to their annual estimates than to forecast interim reports. At 
quarterly level at the U.S. markets good news intercept is insignificant and at Eurozone 
markets good and bad news intercepts are insignificant at interim level. The intercept for prior 
bad news is significant in the U.S. markets.  
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Slope coefficients for prior forecasting error (α3 and α4) are positive or insignificant both in 
the Eurozone and the U.S. markets. This means that analysts are reacting over-conservatively 
to their prior forecasting errors. After good news estimates are still too pessimistic and after 
poor performance (bad news) analysts estimates are too high. Also intercept terms and slope 
coefficients are all higher at the Eurozone markets. It seems that analysts are more affected by 
biases on European markets and produce consensus forecasts less efficiently.  
Market capitalization (α5) of the equity has as expected negative sign. There is more 
information available from large firms and therefore forecasts are more accurate for larger 
firms. It seems that standard deviation of the forecasts is good indicator of the information 
uncertainty. Its coefficient (α6) is significant for all datasets expect annual dataset from the 
Eurozone. It also has expected positive sign which indicates that under larger information 
uncertainty forecasts become more positively biased.  
Table 11 show regression results for sales forecasting errors. With sales forecasting errors the 
results are quite different from ones obtained from earnings forecasts. First of all sales have 
negative intercept terms (α1 and α2)  regardless of the prior year surprises at annual level. Still 
at interim level only negative sales surprises have significant intercept term in the U.S. 
markets and this intercept term is positive. At annual level all slope coefficients are 
statistically highly significant and positive. Slope coefficients (α3 and α4) are also higher for 
annual level forecast errors which is puzzling because final analyst consensus forecasts are 
recorded only one month before the end of the financial year. When comparing prior sales 
surprises on two different markets, there is one interesting finding that in the U.S. markets 
analysts are less likely to be affected by good news than in the Eurozone. Otherwise slope 
coefficients (α3 and α4) in the U.S. and the Eurozone are quite close each others at annual 
level. Very surprising result is that coefficients for market capitalization (α5) are highly 
positive. This could be cognitive bias among analysts that large, well-known and successful 
companies could generate excessively sales growth. 
One of the several differences between the U.S. and the Eurozone markets is how forecast 
variability affects the accuracy of the sales forecasts. In Europe the factor (α6) is insignificant. 
Still in the U.S. larger uncertainty about sales (i.e. higher standard deviation between 
forecasts) reduces average forecasting bias. Standard deviation of the forecasts is used as 
proxy for information environment. With high information uncertainty standard deviation 
should be high and when there is ample information available standard deviation of forecasts 
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should be smaller. It is also very surprising that with sales analysts’ forecast dispersion has 
negative effect whereas with earnings forecasts it has positive effect. High informational 
uncertainty should not have effect on forecasting bias but just widen the distribution of the 
forecasting errors. The positive coefficient in analysts’ forecasts dispersion variable might 
indicate that under high uncertainty some analysts are ready to sacrifice their unbiased 
forecasts to attain information from the firm’s management.  
Table 12 contains regression results for earnings forecasting errors for subperiods. In the U.S. 
markets all statistically significant intercepts and coefficients have gotten closer to zero at 
latter time period 2003-2010. It could indicate that the U.S. earnings forecasts have become 
more efficient since implementation of the regulation changes (i.e. Regulation Fair Disclosure 
and Global Settlement). Comparison to the Eurozone is difficult with data from Table 12 
because none of the figures are statistically significant in earlier period and on latter period 
there are only two significant values (slope for bad news α4 and standard deviation of 
forecasts α6). The measure for uncertainty (α6 forecasts’ standard deviation) has increased 
which hints that some analysts are compensating tightened regulation by buying information 
with larger positive bias. However, it is still possible to compare those results to the results 
from the U.S. markets. The slope coefficient (α4) for bad news is 2.5 times higher and 
standard deviation of forecasts is almost 100 times higher in the Eurozone markets.  
 Table 13 contains regression results of forecasts errors for sales for subperiods. At earlier 
period there are very few observations in both market areas. It would affect how statistically 
significant the results will be. In the U.S. markets for period 1994-2000 there is only one 
statistically significant value which is positive slope coefficient (α3) for prior good news. 
However, latter time period (2003-2010) yields the results which are all statistically 
significant. Intercept term (α1) in the U.S. markets after good news is negative which makes 
sales forecasts very different from earnings forecasts. Same time, after bad news intercept 
term (α2) is clearly positive. The slope coefficient (α3) for bad news is only one third of the 
corresponding slope coefficient for good news (α4). It seems that after weak performance (bad 
news) analysts think that the firm will improve its sales more than is realistic and after good 
performance (good news) they are likely to keep their estimates too low and be pessimistic 
about future growth. At least sales forecasting error hints to this kind of direction. In the 
Eurozone markets once again the only significant value, slope coefficient for prior bad news 
is twice as high as corresponding term for the U.S. markets.  
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Table 14 shows final results of Chow-test for similarity of the subperiods. For earnings it 
seems clear that something has happened between 1994-2000 and 2003-2010 periods. The 
same regression intercept and coefficient terms should not be used anymore and I can argue 
that regulation has affected some characteristics of the U.S. markets. The Eurozone sample is 
of course much smaller but still Chow-test confirms that there has not been any significant 
change between time periods. For sales difference between sample sizes is extremely large 
which makes Chow-test unreliable and therefore sales forecasting errors will not be tested.   
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Table 14. Chow-test for analysts’ forecasting bias for earnings on subperiods 1994-2000 and 2003-2009 
Note: The table contains Chow-test results for the similarity of the samples between subsamples. I have 
used annual earnings forecasting errors because sizes of these samples are fairly close each other. The 
difference in size for quarterly data to effectively use for Chow-test is too large.  
 RSS1 RSS2 TSS F-test statistics 
earnings, U.S. 0,183455401 0,986523629 1,171034013 3,170267024 
(0.4%) 
earnings, 
Eurozone 
0,005642909 0,291140671 0,297614901 0,36834526 
(89.9%) 
  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
There definitely has happened a change in the U.S. markets after implementation of new 
regulation (i.e. Reg FD). Forecasting errors for earnings are now much more volatile than 
earlier. However, some well-known biases’ effects have become weaker. This effectively 
means that analyst get less non-public information from management. This increases volatility 
of the forecasting errors. At same time the convergence of analysts’ forecasts is much 
stronger than earlier which means that analysts having same kind of information available 
tend to end to similar conclusions. This has made information environment more equal for 
analysts and investors. There are differences at which level forecasting errors are recorded: 
annually or quarterly. At annual level forecasting bias starts from higher level but it is 
affected less by prior earnings surprises and the company size reduces the bias more strongly. 
Annual level forecasts become more accurate over time which is quite natural because more 
data becomes available and quite a large part of the earnings/sales are already known at the 
very end of the financial year. With interim forecasts this is not the case because every interim 
forecasts are recorded at the time when there is still one third of the time period still to come 
(about one month prior the release of the interim reports) whereas with annual forecasts there 
is only about one tenth of the time period yet to come.  
Same kind of development has not happened in the Eurozone markets. The U.S. markets have 
become informational more efficient whereas the Eurozone markets have remained the same 
which surely has implications on effectiveness of the capital markets and costs of raising 
financing for the firms. Almost every single variable’s coefficient form regression analysis is 
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larger in the Eurozone markets than the U.S. markets. There are several very worrisome 
observations to notice: for example analysts’ estimates do not converge at the Eurozone 
markets which shows that information asymmetry is not reduced and that there are analysts 
and investors with knowledge which is not available to all other analysts and investors; and it 
seems that analysts’ in the Eurozone markets are more affected by their prior forecasting 
errors than their counterparts at the U.S. markets. There has been significant development in 
the U.S. markets which has made that market more competitive and same time the Eurozone 
has been lost its competitiveness. This might become hindrance for firms located in the 
Eurozone markets and raise their cost of capital. I compared sales and earnings forecasts in 
order to find out does analysts’ forecasts contain purposely added bias.  
Further research will be needed in order to evaluate if investors compensate this difference in 
the level of information content of the analysts’ forecasts in some way or another. It would be 
interesting to measure whether analysts produce value equally between markets with their 
recommendations. This study answered to the question whether there are differences between 
the U.S. and the Eurozone markets in terms of analysts’ accuracy. This study also revealed 
how analysts’ forecasts and forecasting errors are related to some well-known biases. More 
importantly I also tested whether regulation changes at the U.S. markets have improved the 
information asymmetry and whether has those changes spilled to other highly developed 
financial markets (i.e. the Eurozone markets).  
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